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oreign exchange swaps have appeared for some time in the inter-
vention toolkit of many central banks around the world, although
their popularity seems to be on the wane. In a Bank for Inter-
national Settlements survey taken in 1997 (BIS 1997, p. 332), seven of
fourteen industrial-country central banks surveyed listed foreign
exchange swaps against either the U.S. dollar or the deutsche mark 
(or both) among the tools used to conduct open market intervention. 
Of those seven, five—Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands—discontinued foreign exchange operations when they
became part of the European Monetary Union. Of the remaining two,
Australia and Switzerland, only the latter has used foreign exchange
swaps extensively, at some point as its main intervention tool, with the
total amount of swaps hovering for years at about 40 percent of the mon-
etary base. This use partly reflected the limited depth of domestic debt
markets associated with limited fiscal deficits historically incurred by the
Swiss government.
Formally, a foreign exchange (FX) swap is a financial transaction
whereby two parties exchange agreed-upon amounts of two currencies as
a spot transaction, simultaneously agreeing to unwind the exchange at a
future date, based on a rule that reflects both interest and principal pay-
ments. When the initiating agent is a central bank, the motivation for
undertaking the swap is usually either to affect domestic liquidity or to
manage foreign exchange reserves. (Rarely, central banks have been
known to use currency swaps for the main purpose of hedging and asset-
liability management.)12 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
As described above, intervention through FX
swaps can be thought of as a repurchase agreement
(repo) with foreign currency as the underlying collat-
eral instead of securities. When the forward leg of the
operation is missing, the transaction becomes formally
similar to an outright open market operation with for-
eign exchange as the underlying asset, and the opera-
tion is usually classified as FX “intervention,” rather
than a swap. In parallel fashion, a distinction is often
made with respect to the scope of the operation: While
FX swaps are usually seen as aimed at controlling
domestic liquidity, FX intervention is usually seen as
aimed at influencing the exchange rate.
By virtue of combining a spot and a forward
transaction, FX swaps can also be priced easily, based
on available forward quotations and, generally, satis-
fying the covered interest parity condition. Viewing
swaps essentially as forward transactions also high-
lights requirements for their effective use—namely,
price stability, depth of the underlying forward mar-
ket, and ready availability of quotes—requirements
that have led most central banks active in the swap
market to undertake operations mostly in U.S. dollars
or, until 1998, deutsche marks.
From the viewpoint of central bank risk manage-
ment, FX swaps are no riskier than standard repo
operations, since the central bank is not assuming any
of the underlying FX risk, by virtue of the covered
nature of the swap position. However, FX swaps have
been used in combination with spot FX intervention in
a way that can lead to significant risk-bearing by the
central bank: If the central bank uses the foreign cur-
rency obtained as collateral in the swap transaction to
defend an exchange parity under pressure, it will incur
losses if the defense fails before the forward leg of the
swap transaction is unwound.
AcontributingreasonwhyFXswapshavenotbeen
particularly popular as tools for monetary control is
that FX transactions normally are settled on the second
business day following the trade, in part because the
transaction typically involves a transfer of liabilities
between central banks—so as to debit the sending
party’s account and credit the receiving party’s
account—and the two central banks may be in different
timezones.Thisresultsinadeliverylagequaltoatleast
the time difference plus the difference between each
country’s local time for final settlement.1 This arrange-
ment makes FX swaps ill-suited for swift action and has
caused several countries using FX swaps to routinely
renew them at maturity, leaving the burden for high-
frequency liquidity control to alternative instruments.
The relative scarcity of banks sufficiently large and
endowed with foreign currency on hand to act as coun-
terparties has also contributed adversely to the diffu-
sion of FX swaps as instruments for liquidity control.
1Hence, for instance, U.S. dollar/Canadian dollar swaps are
normally settled on the first business day after the trade. 
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